Carcelli, Shannon P. Competing for foreign aid
Economic assistance--Political aspects--United States
"The United States authorizes dozens of bureaucracies to carry out foreign policy, often resulting in chaos and bureaucratic infighting. Rather than a centrally driven plan, I argue that this bureaucratic fragmentation is an unintended byproduct of the foreign policy-making process. Members of Congress, and the interests they represent, have diverse policy visions, leading them to seek allies within the bureaucracy to elevate their pet projects. In an attempt to build a compromise, leaders may dilute foreign policy authority to please as many legislators as possible. The fragmentation of congressional interests translates to fragmentation in the foreign policy bureaucracy. This book proposes two factors that lead to fragmentation: congressional interest and disunity. When a policy is salient, congressional leadership is motivated to push an agenda, supplying more pet projects in order to do so. Thus, congressional interest increases fragmentation. Additionally, when members of Congress disagree about policy, they demand a greater variety of pet projects. Therefore, congressional disunity also increases fragmentation. The five empirical chapters show how the combination of interest and disunity spurs Congress to fragment foreign policy. The first empirical chapters are purely quantitative, each measuring one of these two factors. The next three chapters complement the statistical analysis with a novel form of mixed-method case study. Each case focuses on an area of US foreign aid policy, considering congressional action and legislation. The case studies combine qualitative process-tracing with a quantitative analysis of legislative voting. I find that fragmentation is inherent in the policymaking process"-- Provided by publisher.